An abstract from the RAND Corp study released this past week reads:
How do terrorist groups end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that terrorist groups rarely cease to exist as a result of winning or losing a military campaign. Rather, most groups end because of operations carried out by local police or intelligence agencies or because they join the political process. This suggests that the United States should pursue a counterterrorism strategy against al Qa’ida that emphasizes policing and intelligence gathering rather than a “war on terrorism” approach that relies heavily on military force.
The United States cannot conduct an effective counterterrorism campaign against al Qa'ida or other terrorist groups without understanding how such groups end. While it is clear that U.S. policymakers will need to turn to a range of policy instruments to conduct such campaigns — including careful police and intelligence work, military force, political negotiations, and economic sanctions — what is less clear is how they should prioritize U.S. efforts.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9351/index1.html I have been arguing this approach since the beginning of tehwaron terror after 911. The RAND Corporation, a conservative ‘Think Thank” that the Pentagon has consulted with for decades, states my argument in the above press release. The full report is available at the listed url.
